Public Choice III Dennis C. Mueller’s is an English-language textbook that focuses on public choice and its applications in economics and political science. The book is intended for students and professionals in higher education who seek an in-depth understanding of the theory and practice of public choice.
This edition is a comprehensive revision and expansion of Public Choice II from 1989. Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been thoroughly revised. The empirical analysis in public choice has been significantly expanded, covering all major topics, such as the existence of the state, voting procedures, federalism, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, and political business cycles.
In addition, the book also addresses normative issues in public choice, including social welfare functions, Arrow’s and Sen’s impossibility theorems, Rawls’ social contract, and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock. This makes it a valuable source for students and professionals seeking to deepen their understanding of both the theory and application of public choice.
Topics connect with economic theory, philosophy, elections, and referendums, as well as the economic theory of firms and government.